Why US moved from backing Iran protests to nuclear talks

jpost.com · Feb 23, 2026 · Collected from GDELT

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ByHERB KEINONFEBRUARY 23, 2026 20:09Updated: FEBRUARY 23, 2026 22:38The current standoff with Iran raises several questions. But two, in particular, stand out.The first is this: If, as US President Donald Trump said immediately after last June’s 12-day war with Iran, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program was totally “obliterated,” then what exactly are the nuclear negotiations set to continue in Geneva on Thursday about?The second is when and why the massive US force buildup against Iran shifted from supporting protesters and stopping the regime’s crackdown – the original justification – to pressuring Tehran over its nuclear program.The first question highlights the dissonance between “the nuclear program was obliterated” and “we are negotiating over the nuclear program.” The second asks why Trump’s battle cry just weeks ago, “Help is on the way to the protesters,” has now fallen silent.Regarding the first question, Trump loudly trumpeted the destruction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities immediately after the June war.Satellite imagery from Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility June 22, 2025. (credit: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/VIA REUTERS )“Monumental Damage was done to all nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images. Obliteration is an accurate term!” he posted on Truth Social after America’s “beautiful” B-2s hit installations at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.As recently as last Thursday, at the first meeting of the new Board of Peace in Washington, Trump said America’s bombers “went into Iran and totally decimated the nuclear potential. When it decimated that, all of a sudden, we had peace in the Middle East.”If that is the case – totally decimated, absolutely obliterated – then why is the nuclear issue back on the table? What is there left to negotiate?Why the nuclear issue is back on the tableThe answer lies in the distinction between what the operation physically accomplished, the language used to describe it, and the longer-term goals driving US policy.A nuclear program is not a single target. It is not one building, one centrifuge hall, or one cache of enriched uranium. It is an industrial complex – facilities, equipment, technical expertise, supply chains, data, and institutional knowledge.Military strikes can devastate infrastructure. They can destroy enrichment facilities, damage reactors, and degrade stockpiles. They can significantly set back operational capability. But they cannot erase scientific knowledge or eliminate intent.When Trump and other US officials said the program was “obliterated,” they were – if one is to be charitable – describing its immediate operational state, its industrial-scale enrichment capacity, and its ability to move toward weaponization. That was smashed.But destroying current capability is not the same as eliminating the ability to rebuild.Iran still has nuclear scientists, though some of its leading figures were killed. It retains technical blueprints. It may have hidden or recoverable material. It can rebuild, unless constraints are imposed.That is where the negotiations come in.Where military action falls shortMilitary action changes facts on the ground. Diplomacy seeks to shape what comes next.Even after a heavy blow, core questions remain: What remains of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile? What equipment survived? Will limited civilian enrichment be permitted? What inspection regime will apply? What sanctions will be lifted – or maintained?Those issues persist, even if – in Trump’s telling – the program was “obliterated.” And those issues are now on the table.Israel, notably, was more circumspect in its rhetoric. IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir said after the war, “We significantly damaged the nuclear program… and set it back by years – I repeat – years.”But years are not forever.Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich clarified the point in a KAN Reshet Bet interview, explaining that intelligence in late 2024 showed Iran racing to the bomb and tripling ballistic missile production. That immediate existential threat, he said, was “removed very successfully” and postponed for several years.Yet the regime remains in place. It has not renounced its designs to destroy Israel or signaled that it will not rebuild its nuclear program. Negotiations are meant to ensure that it can’t reconstitute that program.Which brings us to the protesters.The pivot from the protests to the nuclear issueUpward of 30,000 people were reportedly killed in last month’s unrest. That crackdown was the original trigger for the US armada heading to the Middle East – a signal that “help is on its way.”Iranian protestors in Abdanan. January 6, 2026. (credit: screenshot/section 27a copyright act)In early January, Trump’s rhetoric tied potential US action directly to Tehran’s repression. By the end of the month, however, the justification had shifted. The focus moved from aiding protesters and urging them to “take over your institutions” to warning that Iran must halt its nuclear program or face consequences.Abruptly, the armada on the way to the Mideast was there not to back the protesters, but to pressure Iran to stop nuclear development.Why the pivot? Why did the protest file, which only weeks earlier was central to Washington’s posture, suddenly recede?Because Washington concluded that the nuclear file was more urgent, more controllable, and less politically costly than an overtly pro-protest policy.In early January, the regime appeared brittle, and the moral case was clear. But a morally compelling cause does not automatically translate into a workable policy.Washington’s Arab and Muslim partners – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, and Qatar – quietly and firmly warned that a US strike framed as “saving protesters” could trigger broad Iranian retaliation, including attacks on Gulf infrastructure and US bases. Energy markets would be shaken. The region could spiral.Those allies pressed for restraint and for channeling US leverage into a nuclear arrangement rather than into regime-targeted intervention.Fears of regional escalationHuman rights were not their organizing concern. What worried them most was the prospect of escalation – and the long-term threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, not the regime’s brutality toward its own citizens.Nor are those countries’ liberal democracies organized around human rights advocacy. Their systems are built on stability, control, and regime continuity. From their perspective, an American policy framed around empowering street protests in a neighboring state is not only destabilizing for Iran; it is a precedent that could have ramifications for them.Inside the administration, skepticism also grew about what “help” would mean. Heavy US involvement could allow Tehran to brand demonstrators as American agents, potentially weakening the movement.And once the protest wave was brutally suppressed, Washington’s ability to influence events on the ground diminished sharply. If Trump intended to act in response to the protests, the window closed.The nuclear file, by contrast, remained an arena where the US retained leverage. Military deployments could be converted into bargaining power.There was also domestic politics. A nuclear outcome – whether a deal or a calibrated strike – is something Trump can present as advancing American security interests.An intervention “for the protesters,” which could not be sold to Trump’s base as a core US interest, carries far greater risk if it spirals.Supporting the protesters was rhetorically powerful, but constraining Iran’s nuclear program became the governing priority.Washington concluded that preventing a nuclear Iran carried fewer risks and outweighed the impulse to intervene in a revolution it could not control.