U.S. Strikes on Iran Appear Imminent as Military Buildup Intensifies and Diplomacy Stalls

10 predicted events · 20 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929

Current Situation: The Eve of Military Action

The United States appears to be in the final stages of preparation for military strikes against Iran, with multiple indicators suggesting action could occur within days. The State Department issued an authorized departure order for non-essential U.S. personnel and their families from Israel on February 27, 2026, with Ambassador Mike Huckabee urging staff to leave "TODAY" (Articles 1, 2). Simultaneously, American personnel are reportedly being evacuated from bases in Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain—installations that would be in immediate danger of Iranian retaliation. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group has been positioned near Israel's coast and departed Crete on February 26, capable of reaching operational zones within 24 hours (Articles 1, 2, 16). A second aircraft carrier is en route to the region, representing one of the most significant U.S. military buildups in the Middle East in recent years (Articles 13, 20). This crisis follows the collapse of nuclear negotiations in Geneva, despite claims of "significant progress" by Oman's foreign minister (Article 16). President Trump's State of the Union address on February 24 made clear his position: while preferring diplomacy, he "will never allow the world's number one sponsor of terror" to obtain nuclear weapons (Article 1).

Key Trends and Strategic Calculations

### The "Israel-First" Strategy A particularly revealing development comes from Politico's reporting that Trump advisers are "privately arguing that an Israeli attack would trigger Iran to retaliate, helping muster support from American voters for a U.S. strike" (Article 10). This calculated approach to building domestic political support suggests the administration is deeply concerned about public opinion regarding another Middle Eastern military engagement. As one official stated: "There's thinking in and around the administration that the politics are a lot better if the Israelis go first and alone and the Iranians retaliate against us, and give us more reason to take action" (Article 10). This cynical but pragmatic calculation indicates that the "when" of strikes may depend partly on whether Israel can be convinced to act first. ### Iran's Likely Response Profile Multiple analytical sources converge on Iran's probable response strategy. The Alma Research and Education Center assessment, widely cited in Articles 7 and 8, identifies Iran's top-priority targets as: 1. **Israel**: Cities, critical infrastructure, airports, and military installations—despite Israel's potentially limited direct involvement in U.S. strikes 2. **U.S. military bases** throughout the Middle East, particularly in Gulf states 3. **Maritime targets**: Including potential attempts to close or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world's oil passes Iran retains "hundreds of missiles capable of hitting Israel" despite losses during the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 (Articles 13, 17, 20). More significantly, Iran possesses a "much larger arsenal of shorter-range missiles" that can target U.S. bases and naval forces (Article 6). Brigadier General (Ret.) Amir Avivi warns that Iran could launch as many as 500 missiles instantly in a preemptive strike—a volume that would challenge even Israel's sophisticated air defenses (Article 11). ### The Proxy Network Factor Iran's response will likely extend beyond direct military action. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen remain potent force multipliers, with analysts predicting Hezbollah would play "the largest role" among proxy forces (Articles 7, 8). Additionally, Iranian-aligned groups may attempt "terror attacks or sabotage activity within Israel" (Article 7), expanding the conflict beyond conventional military engagements.

Predictions: What Happens Next

### Immediate Timeframe (1-7 Days) The convergence of signals—personnel evacuations occurring "TODAY," carrier positioning, and the reported stalling of diplomacy—suggests the decision point has arrived. However, the administration's desire for Israeli action first introduces uncertainty. If technical talks scheduled for Vienna on March 2 (Article 16) are canceled or fail immediately, this would remove the last diplomatic off-ramp. **Most Likely Scenario**: Initial strikes occur within 3-5 days, potentially beginning with Israeli operations against Iranian nuclear facilities or missile sites, followed by U.S. strikes within 24-48 hours after Iranian retaliation provides the desired political justification. ### Medium-Term Developments (1-4 Weeks) Following initial strikes, Iran faces a strategic dilemma. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has warned that Iran could "sink American warships" and that a U.S. attack would spark "regional war" (Articles 6, 13). Iran's U.N. ambassador declared "all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force in the region" as legitimate targets (Article 13). The conflict will likely follow a pattern of: 1. **Immediate Iranian retaliation** against Israel and U.S. bases, potentially including 200-500 missiles launched at Israel and simultaneous strikes on U.S. installations in Iraq, Syria, Qatar, and Bahrain 2. **Proxy activation**: Hezbollah launches rocket and drone attacks from Lebanon; Houthis target shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 3. **Escalatory U.S. response**: Expanded strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, leadership targets, and potentially the nuclear program 4. **Economic disruption**: Oil prices spike as Iran attempts to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz ### Strategic Outlook (1-3 Months) The fundamental asymmetry—Iran being "outgunned" but still able to "inflict considerable pain" (Articles 6, 9, 13, 20)—suggests a prolonged, messy conflict rather than a clean, decisive outcome. Iran's vulnerability after the 2025 war with Israel and recent anti-government protests (Article 6) may lead the regime to feel that aggressive retaliation is necessary for survival, even if militarily futile. The most dangerous wild card remains the potential for miscalculation. As Article 12 notes, "Iran did not necessarily reveal the full extent of its capabilities" during the 12-day war, creating uncertainty for U.S. and Israeli planners. An unexpectedly effective Iranian response could trigger further escalation beyond what either side initially intended.

Conclusion: The Point of No Return

All indicators suggest the diplomatic window has effectively closed, despite ongoing technical talks serving as political cover. The U.S. military is positioned, personnel are being evacuated from harm's way, and the political groundwork is being laid for action. The question is no longer "if" but "when" and "how"—with the Trump administration's preference for an Israeli-first approach potentially delaying but not preventing what now appears to be an inevitable military confrontation. The coming days will likely witness the most significant U.S. military action against Iran since the 1980s, with profound implications for regional stability, global energy markets, and the durability of the post-2003 Middle Eastern order.