
7 predicted events · 8 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929
The November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, brokered by the United States and France after 13 months of conflict, appears to be unraveling. Recent Israeli strikes in Lebanon represent the deadliest attacks since the ceasefire took effect, signaling a dangerous escalation that threatens to reignite full-scale hostilities. On February 20-21, 2026, Israel conducted multiple strikes across Lebanon. According to Article 2, Israeli airstrikes in the Baalbek region of eastern Lebanon's Bekaa Valley killed eight Hezbollah members, including three local commanders—Ali al-Moussawi, Mohammed al-Moussawi, and Hussein Yaghi. Article 5 reports the total death toll at 10 people. Separately, Article 6 documents an Israeli drone strike on Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp, which killed at least two Hamas members. These attacks follow a pattern of "near-daily strikes" that Israel has conducted since the ceasefire began, as noted in Article 5. Article 7 and Article 8 describe an earlier February 15 strike near the Lebanon-Syria border that killed four people, reportedly targeting Islamic Jihad operatives.
### Hezbollah's Rhetorical Shift The most significant development is Hezbollah's increasingly combative stance. Article 1 reports that a Hezbollah official declared "resistance" as the only option following the deadly strikes. This rhetoric marks a potential turning point, suggesting the organization may be preparing its constituency for a return to armed conflict rather than restraint. ### Israel's Justification Strategy Israel has consistently framed its strikes as responses to ceasefire violations. According to Article 2, the Israeli Defense Forces claimed the targeted Hezbollah members were "operating to accelerate readiness and force build-up processes" and "planning fire attacks toward Israel," constituting "a violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon." This justification framework suggests Israel has adopted a preemptive posture that effectively nullifies the ceasefire's constraints. ### Targeting Pattern Expansion The strikes have expanded beyond Hezbollah to include Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets, indicating Israel views all Palestinian and Lebanese militant infrastructure as legitimate targets regardless of the ceasefire's specific terms. The attack on Ein el-Hilweh (Article 6) is particularly significant as it strikes a densely populated civilian area, raising the risk of broader Lebanese public anger. ### Death of Notable Figures The killing of Hussein Yaghi, son of a prominent Hezbollah founder and close aide to the late Hassan Nasrallah (Article 2), carries symbolic weight that may compel Hezbollah to respond to maintain credibility with its base.
### Short-Term: Measured Hezbollah Response Within the next two weeks, Hezbollah will likely conduct limited retaliatory strikes against Israeli military targets, possibly in the disputed Shebaa Farms area or against Israeli positions that remain in southern Lebanon. The organization faces internal pressure to respond following the "resistance is the only option" declaration, but also recognizes that Lebanon's devastated infrastructure cannot sustain another full war. This response will be calibrated to demonstrate resolve without triggering the massive Israeli retaliation that a major attack would invite. Hezbollah learned from the 2024 conflict that Israel is willing to inflict severe damage on Lebanese civilian infrastructure. ### Medium-Term: Ceasefire Framework Erosion Within one to two months, the November 2024 ceasefire will exist only on paper. Both sides will engage in tit-for-tat strikes with increasing frequency, creating a "frozen conflict" state similar to the 2006-2024 period but with more frequent violations. Article 5 notes that the ceasefire called for both Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters to leave southern Lebanon—the continued Israeli presence and strikes suggest neither side has fully complied. The United States and France, the ceasefire brokers, will attempt diplomatic intervention but will lack the leverage to enforce compliance. International attention will remain divided by other global crises, limiting external pressure for de-escalation. ### Long-Term: Three Potential Scenarios By mid-2026, three scenarios become possible: **Scenario 1 (40% probability): Managed Instability** - Israel and Hezbollah settle into a pattern of limited, controlled exchanges that avoid full war but maintain constant tension. Both sides accept this as preferable to the costs of renewed conflict. **Scenario 2 (35% probability): Renewed Conflict** - A miscalculation or particularly deadly strike triggers escalation that neither side can control. This could involve Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli cities or Israeli strikes on Beirut, leading to a return to the intensity of the 2024 war. **Scenario 3 (25% probability): Regional Dimension** - The Lebanon conflict becomes absorbed into broader regional dynamics involving Iran, Syria, and potentially other actors, transforming from a bilateral Israel-Hezbollah dispute into a wider confrontation.
Several factors will determine which scenario unfolds: the level of Iranian support and guidance to Hezbollah; domestic political pressures on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (Article 5 mentions recent economic cooperation discussions, suggesting some Israeli interest in stability); Lebanon's economic capacity to absorb further conflict; and international diplomatic engagement intensity. The current trajectory points toward further deterioration before any stabilization occurs. The combination of Hezbollah's hardening rhetoric, Israel's expansive interpretation of permitted self-defense actions, and the killing of symbolically important figures creates conditions ripe for escalation that both sides may struggle to control.
Hezbollah's public declaration that 'resistance is the only option' creates internal pressure to respond, while the killing of Hussein Yaghi (son of a prominent founder) demands a credible reply to maintain organizational credibility
Israel has conducted 'near-daily strikes' since the ceasefire and shows no indication of restraint; the pattern of targeting multiple groups (Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad) suggests an expanding target list
As the original ceasefire brokers, both nations have reputational stakes in the agreement's survival and will likely attempt mediation as violations increase
The ceasefire terms require both sides to withdraw from southern Lebanon and cease hostilities; continued violations by both parties and escalating rhetoric suggest the framework is unsustainable
Recent strikes have already killed 10+ civilians in single incidents; expanding target lists and strikes in populated areas like refugee camps increase civilian casualty risk
Iran uses Hezbollah as a key proxy and will likely respond to its losses and Israel's aggressive posture by reinforcing capabilities, though avoiding direct confrontation
While both sides have incentives to avoid full-scale war, the escalation dynamics, symbolic killings, and hardening rhetoric create conditions where miscalculation or intentional escalation becomes possible