
7 predicted events · 20 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929
Peru has once again demonstrated its remarkable political instability by installing its eighth president in a decade. On February 19, 2026, the Peruvian Congress elected 83-year-old José María Balcázar Zelada as interim president, replacing José Jerí who was ousted after just 130 days in office over corruption allegations related to the "Chifagate" scandal involving undisclosed meetings with Chinese businessmen (Articles 6, 18, 19). Balcázar will serve only until July 28, 2026, when the winner of the April 12 general elections takes office—a mere five-month tenure that raises serious questions about governance effectiveness.
Balcázar's presidency begins under the darkest cloud of public disapproval in recent memory. According to an Ipsos poll published exclusively in Perú21, a staggering 63% of Peruvians disapprove of his designation, with only 24% approving (Article 1). This contrasts sharply with his predecessor Jerí, who began with 45% approval. More troubling, 81% of citizens believe the situation in Peru will not improve under Balcázar's administration, with 55% expecting no change and 26% anticipating deterioration (Article 1). The 83-year-old lawyer and former judge from Perú Libre—the same leftist party that brought Pedro Castillo to power—carries considerable baggage. He has been widely criticized for defending child marriage and making controversial statements about early sexual relations (Article 9). Additionally, he faces 13 open fiscal investigations (Article 2), though he claims no formal sanctions or convictions (Article 6). Political analyst José Carlos Requena noted that Balcázar has shown "contradictions" and an "ánimo gaseoso" (unfocused spirit) in his first days, failing to even define his cabinet (Article 1).
Balcázar's election itself has sparked controversy. In a secret ballot, he received 64 votes out of 113 present—a majority that analysts believe came partially from right-wing parties like Fuerza Popular and Renovación Popular, despite their public opposition to "the extreme left" (Articles 3, 6). These neoliberal parties are now trading accusations about who enabled a leftist president to assume power, with each blaming the other for betraying conservative principles (Article 3). The left-wing Bloque Democrático notably withdrew after the first round rather than vote for either Balcázar or his right-wing opponent María del Carmen Alva (Article 3).
### 1. A Caretaker Government with No Meaningful Reforms Balcázar has already signaled that his brief administration will maintain the neoliberal economic policies in place for over 30 years and will prioritize combating crime—the same agenda where previous administrations have failed (Article 3). With only five months in office and facing overwhelming disapproval, Balcázar lacks both the time and political capital to implement significant changes. His government will function purely as a caretaker administration, focused on maintaining basic governmental operations until the transition. Political analyst José Carlos Requena's observation about Balcázar's early "contradictions" and failure to define his cabinet suggests an administration that will struggle even with basic governance tasks (Article 1). The vicegobernadora of Puno, Margot de la Riva Valle, articulated the core problem: "No podemos estar en un gobierno que cambiemos cada tres, cinco o seis meses" (We cannot have a government that changes every three, five, or six months) (Article 5). Without completing a full term, no president can consolidate power, correct errors, or implement coherent policies. ### 2. Continued Economic Stability Despite Political Chaos One of the most remarkable aspects of Peru's political dysfunction is the persistence of economic stability. As Article 4 notes, while Congress was ousting its seventh president in a decade, "the economy of the country continued operating normally." Peru has maintained low inflation, exchange rate stability, above-regional-average economic growth, and high international reserves despite the political turmoil. The country's robust institutions—particularly its independent central bank and established fiscal frameworks—have insulated economic management from political interference. However, Article 4 also warns that "legislative deterioration and populism have begun to strain such balance." The continued stability should not be taken for granted, and the upcoming elections will be critical in determining whether institutional safeguards can withstand increasing populist pressures. ### 3. Intensified Campaign Dynamics with 38 Presidential Candidates With 38 candidates competing in the April 12 first round (Article 4), Peru faces what may be its most fragmented election in recent history. The deep political fragmentation reflects what Margot de la Riva identified as the fundamental problem: "the absence of parties with real organic structure," where "personal interests replace collective projects" (Article 5). The campaign will likely be dominated by three themes: criticism of Congress's excessive power, promises to combat crime and corruption, and debates over economic policy continuity versus change. Balcázar's presence as president—despite his unpopularity—may inadvertently benefit centrist and right-wing candidates who can position themselves as alternatives to both the discredited political establishment and the controversial leftist incumbent. ### 4. The Bicameral Congress Transition Will Create New Uncertainties Peru is transitioning from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature, with 130 deputies and 60 senators replacing the current 130-member single chamber (Article 2). This structural change, implemented after decades of unicameral governance, aims to "improve the quality of laws, political control, and territorial representation" through a "double analysis" system (Article 2). However, the transition to 190 total legislators (up from 130) will create new complexities during an already chaotic political period. The division of powers between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will need to be negotiated in practice, potentially creating new sources of institutional conflict. Given Peru's history of congressional overreach—using "permanent moral incaptivity" provisions to repeatedly oust presidents—the bicameral structure could either provide helpful checks and balances or create additional veto points for political obstruction. ### 5. Potential for Another Presidential Crisis Before July With 13 open fiscal investigations against him (Article 2) and a Congress that has demonstrated its willingness to remove presidents on short notice, Balcázar himself could face impeachment before completing his brief term. The secret ballot that brought him to power suggests his support is fragile and potentially transactional. If his right-wing backers become dissatisfied or if public pressure intensifies, Congress could move to remove him just as it did with Jerí. The precedent is clear: Peru has had eight presidents in ten years, with four impeached and removed, and two resigning before their terms ended (Article 17). The last president to complete a full term was Ollanta Humala in 2016 (Article 17). Balcázar's controversial record and the approaching election create conditions where Congress might prefer to install yet another interim president rather than allow someone with his baggage to preside over the electoral process.
Peru's political system is caught in a destructive cycle where Congress accumulates "too much power to remove and appoint presidents," as Margot de la Riva warned (Article 5). The country has proven that robust economic institutions can withstand significant political instability, but as Article 4 cautions, that equilibrium is beginning to show strain. The next five months will test whether Peru can navigate to successful elections without further institutional breakdown, and whether the newly elected government—along with the reformed bicameral Congress—can finally break the cycle of presidential instability that has defined the past decade.
With only 5 months in office, 63% disapproval, and having already committed to maintaining existing neoliberal policies, Balcázar lacks both time and political capital for meaningful change
With 38 candidates competing in a deeply fragmented political landscape, vote splitting makes a first-round majority mathematically improbable
Balcázar's 63% disapproval and controversial background create opportunities for opposition candidates to campaign against the status quo
Peru's robust economic institutions have consistently maintained stability through a decade of political chaos, with independent central bank and fiscal frameworks insulating the economy
Balcázar faces 13 fiscal investigations, was elected through a secret ballot suggesting fragile support, and Congress has removed 4 of the last 8 presidents—creating conditions for potential removal
After decades of unicameral governance, the division of powers between 130 deputies and 60 senators will require practical negotiation during an already chaotic period
Growing frustration with Congress's excessive power to remove presidents, as articulated by regional officials like Margot de la Riva, may translate into organized civil society action