India-Bangladesh Reset: Three Critical Tests Ahead for Rahman's BNP Government

6 predicted events · 11 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929

The Promise of a Fresh Start

The February 12, 2026 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh have created an unexpected diplomatic opening between New Delhi and Dhaka. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, secured a commanding victory with approximately 209 of 299 directly elected seats, marking a decisive shift after the tumultuous period following Sheikh Hasina's August 2024 departure and Muhammad Yunus's controversial interim administration (Article 9). Prime Minister Narendra Modi's swift congratulatory phone call to Rahman—making him the first world leader to reach out personally—signals India's eagerness to move beyond the "Yunus curse" period characterized by antagonistic postures, minority persecution, and a sharp pivot toward China and Pakistan (Article 1). The invitation extended to Modi for Rahman's swearing-in ceremony, alongside 12 other nations including China and Pakistan, demonstrates Bangladesh's intent to pursue a balanced foreign policy (Article 7).

Current Situation: Cautious Optimism Amid Historical Baggage

The diplomatic choreography has been carefully calibrated on both sides. As Article 2 notes, "both sides have largely said the right things, signalled the right intentions and moved quickly to keep the relationship on track." However, this warmth exists against a backdrop of deep-rooted suspicions. India's institutional memory of the 2001-2006 BNP-Jamaat coalition government remains problematic. During that period, Bangladesh maintained cooler relations with India while strengthening ties with Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad (Article 10). The BNP's historical association with Jamaat-e-Islami, which now holds approximately 68 seats as the principal opposition, compounds New Delhi's concerns about extremism and cross-border insurgency (Article 9). Yet there are reasons for measured optimism. Indian diplomatic sources told The Hindu that Rahman's 31-point development agenda, particularly in digital infrastructure and economic modernization, provides concrete areas for bilateral cooperation (Article 8). Critically, Rahman avoided playing the anti-India card during his campaign—a significant departure from past BNP electoral strategies.

Three Critical Tests for the Reset

### 1. The Minority Protection Challenge The treatment of Bangladesh's Hindu minority will serve as the first and most visible test of Rahman's intentions. The Yunus period saw "one of the darkest chapters in Bangladesh's chequered history of violence against Hindu minorities" (Article 1). India will be watching closely for tangible improvements in minority security and political representation. **Prediction**: Within the first 90 days, Rahman will need to demonstrate concrete measures—appointment of minorities to visible government positions, prosecution of perpetrators of violence, and public statements affirming secularism—to maintain India's goodwill. ### 2. The Jamaat Management Question With Jamaat-e-Islami holding significant parliamentary strength, Rahman faces a delicate balancing act. As Article 6 notes, "a stronger presence of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh's new national assembly would be a concern for India-Bangladesh ties." The question is whether Rahman can govern without becoming dependent on Jamaat's support for key legislation. **Prediction**: Rahman will likely maintain distance from formal coalition arrangements with Jamaat, instead engaging them on specific legislative issues while cultivating other parliamentary alliances. However, periods of tension with India are inevitable when Jamaat flexes its political muscle on issues like foreign policy or religious matters. ### 3. The China-Pakistan Calibration Bangladesh's strategic autonomy—signaled by inviting both India and China to the inauguration (Article 7)—is legitimate. However, the depth of engagement with China and Pakistan will test India's tolerance. Article 11 notes that Rahman "has signalled that Bangladesh will chart its course independent of both India and Pakistan." **Prediction**: Expect a pragmatic hedging strategy from Dhaka: maintaining Chinese infrastructure investments while reactivating stalled India-Bangladesh connectivity projects. Trade relations with India will likely improve, but not at the expense of Bangladeshi economic diversification.

The Development Agenda as Common Ground

Perhaps the most promising signal is Rahman's focus on economic development over ideological posturing. As Professor Avinash Paliwal notes in Article 10, "compared to Jamaat, BNP is a politically experienced and moderate party. In that sense, it is a safer bet for India." India's own interests align with Bangladesh's stability and prosperity. The two nations share deep commercial ties, with Bangladesh being India's largest trade partner in South Asia. Rahman's infrastructure and digital economy priorities create natural collaboration opportunities that transcend political differences.

What to Watch

The next six months will be decisive. Key indicators include: - **Resumption of connectivity**: Restarting cross-border trains, buses, and flights would signal normalization - **Water-sharing negotiations**: Progress on the long-stalled Teesta River agreement would demonstrate substantive commitment - **Border management**: Reduction in border killings and improved protocols would address a persistent grievance - **Trade facilitation**: Easing of Indian import restrictions and tariff rationalization would build economic interdependence Article 2 correctly observes that "South Asia doesn't often get a clean reset moment." The Rahman government's early months offer precisely such an opportunity—but only if both sides can transcend historical suspicions and focus on shared interests. The relationship won't return to the Hasina-era closeness, nor should that be the goal. What's possible is something more sustainable: a mature bilateral relationship based on mutual respect, clear red lines, and pragmatic cooperation. As Article 1 acknowledges, political parties do change. The question now is whether the BNP has evolved enough, and whether India is willing to give it the benefit of the doubt while maintaining vigilant oversight of its core security concerns. The onus, as multiple analysts note, is on Tarique Rahman to demonstrate through actions—not just words—that this time will be different.