After El Mencho: Why Mexico's CJNG Cartel Will Likely Survive and Splinter Into Regional Factions

5 predicted events · 20 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929

The Decentralized Cartel That Can Survive Its Leader

The death of Nemesio "El Mencho" Oseguera Cervantes on February 22, 2026, marked what Mexican and U.S. authorities are calling a major victory in the war against organized crime. Yet within hours of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) leader's death, coordinated violence across 20 Mexican states demonstrated that this criminal organization remains formidable even without its founder. The question now is not whether the CJNG will survive, but how it will transform—and whether that transformation will make Mexico safer or more dangerous.

Current Situation: A Violent Transition Period

The military operation that killed El Mencho, conducted with U.S. intelligence support, resulted in at least 73 deaths in total, including 25 National Guard troops who died in six separate retaliatory attacks (Articles 10, 14, 18). The cartel's response was swift and coordinated: "narco-blockades" paralyzed major cities including Guadalajara and Puerto Vallarta, with buses, vehicles, and gas stations set ablaze across multiple states (Article 4). Airlines cancelled flights, schools closed, and the State Department received hundreds of calls from U.S. citizens seeking assistance (Article 9). Mexico deployed approximately 9,500-10,000 troops to restore order (Articles 7, 14), and by February 24, President Claudia Sheinbaum declared that calm was being restored (Article 15). However, the sophisticated coordination of the violence—occurring simultaneously across half the country—revealed the cartel's operational depth and resilience.

Key Structural Advantages: Why CJNG Is Different

Unlike traditional drug trafficking organizations, the CJNG operates through what experts describe as a "decentralized business model" and "criminal franchise model" with international presence (Article 1). This structure fundamentally differs from hierarchical cartels that collapse when leadership is eliminated. According to Article 6, the organization has embraced technology including AI, drones, and social media—modernizing its operations in ways that reduce dependence on any single leader. The cartel, founded in 2009, grew under El Mencho's leadership into one of Mexico's most powerful organizations, commanding "tens of thousands of armed members" and maintaining networks for trafficking heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl into the United States (Article 4). This scale suggests the organization has developed middle management capable of continuing operations independently.

Prediction 1: Survival Through Fragmentation

The CJNG will almost certainly survive El Mencho's death, but not as a unified entity. Within 3-6 months, we should expect the cartel to fragment into 3-5 regional factions, each controlling different territories and potentially adopting different names while maintaining the CJNG brand recognition in their core territories. This prediction is based on several factors. First, as Article 1 notes, experts warn the cartel "could survive the death of its founder" due to its franchise-like structure. The immediate coordinated response to El Mencho's death demonstrates that regional commanders possess both the authority and capability to act independently. Second, the historical pattern in Mexico shows that "decapitation" strategies rarely eliminate cartels but instead create power vacuums that trigger internal succession battles (Article 15). The fragmentation will likely follow geographic lines, with different factions controlling Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and coastal territories. Each faction will compete for legitimacy as El Mencho's true successor while simultaneously fighting rivals.

Prediction 2: Escalating Violence in the Short Term

Mexico should brace for 2-4 months of intensified violence as internal CJNG factions battle for leadership and territory, and as rival cartels—particularly Sinaloa and its factions—attempt to seize CJNG territory during the transition period. Article 4 explicitly states that "fears are mounting that internal rivalries and territorial battles could trigger more violence." The death of 25 National Guard troops in just the first 48 hours (Article 18) provides a baseline for the cartel's willingness to engage security forces. Article 17 notes this loss "will be devastating for Mexico," potentially emboldening cartel elements who see government forces as vulnerable. The prison break in Jalisco, where 23 inmates escaped during a coordinated attack (Article 7), demonstrates the organization's ability to execute complex operations even during crisis. This operational capacity will likely be turned inward as factions compete, and outward as they defend against rival cartels.

Prediction 3: Continued Technological Evolution

The successor factions will accelerate their adoption of technology, particularly drones, encrypted communications, and AI-driven logistics, making them harder to combat through traditional law enforcement methods. Article 6 specifically highlights how the CJNG "embraced AI, drones, and social media" under El Mencho. Without a strong central leader to coordinate through traditional means, regional commanders will likely rely even more heavily on technology for coordination, surveillance, and operations. This technological sophistication may actually increase during the fragmentation period as competing factions seek tactical advantages.

Prediction 4: Pressure on the Sheinbaum Administration

President Sheinbaum will face mounting pressure from both the Trump administration and domestic critics to deliver more "victories" against cartels, potentially leading to additional high-profile operations within the next 6 months that could destabilize other criminal organizations. Article 2 notes that "President Trump has pressured Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to take the fight to powerful criminal syndicates." The El Mencho operation was conducted "with U.S. intelligence support" (Article 8), suggesting close bilateral coordination. Having achieved one high-profile success, both governments will likely seek to capitalize on momentum, even if the strategic wisdom of further "kingpin strategy" operations remains questionable.

The Darker Possibility: A More Dangerous Equilibrium

The most troubling scenario is that the CJNG's decentralized structure proves so resilient that it becomes a model for other organizations. Rather than a unified cartel with a single leader to target, Mexico could face multiple regional criminal franchises—each with sufficient independence to survive leadership losses, but collectively maintaining the same level of violence and drug trafficking. As Article 1 warns, this "criminal franchise model" with "international presence" may prove more durable than traditional cartels. If so, El Mencho's death will be remembered not as a turning point in Mexico's drug war, but as the moment when the cartels evolved beyond the vulnerabilities that made them targetable in the first place.

Conclusion

The coordination and scale of the CJNG's response to El Mencho's death should serve as a wake-up call: this organization was built to survive. The coming months will reveal whether Mexican and U.S. authorities have truly struck a decisive blow, or merely accelerated the evolution of Mexico's criminal landscape into something more fragmented, more resilient, and potentially more difficult to combat. The only certainty is that the violence is far from over.