Hezbollah Financing Ecosystem - Hezbollah Use of Clan Networks in the Diaspora : the Fawaz Clan Case Study

ict.org.il · Feb 17, 2026 · Collected from GDELT

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Abstract This study analyzes how Hezbollah leverages Lebanese Shiite clan-based networks within the diaspora in West Africa, using the Fawaz clan to illustrate the group’s global financing efforts. This research uses open-source research and U.S. Treasury designations to trace the Fawaz clan’s origins in South Lebanon and its expansion across West Africa and their links with Hezbollah back home and in the diaspora. It examines how family-controlled businesses in West Africa operate alongside individuals involved in Hezbollah’s fundraising and operations. The Fawaz clan demonstrates how Hezbollah utilizes extended family networks in the diaspora to support its financial and organizational infrastructure. By combining kinship ties, legitimate businesses, and roles within the Foreign Relations Department (FRD), the family links Shiite communities abroad to Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. This case shows that terrorist financing is often embedded in social and familial structures, making it difficult to distinguish lawful activity from illicit support. This study analyzes how Hezbollah leverages Lebanese Shiite clan-based networks within the diaspora in West Africa, using the Fawaz clan to illustrate the group’s global financing efforts. This research uses open-source research and U.S. Treasury designations to trace the Fawaz clan’s origins in South Lebanon and its expansion across West Africa and their links with Hezbollah back home and in the diaspora. It examines how family-controlled businesses in West Africa operate alongside individuals involved in Hezbollah’s fundraising and operations. The Fawaz clan demonstrates how Hezbollah utilizes extended family networks in the diaspora to support its financial and organizational infrastructure. By combining kinship ties, legitimate businesses, and roles within the Foreign Relations Department (FRD), the family links Shiite communities abroad to Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. This case shows that terrorist financing is often embedded in social and familial structures, making it difficult to distinguish lawful activity from illicit support. Introduction This article is the third in a series of articles exploring the role of clans within Hezbollah’s financial network. These clans operate as financial enablers, channeling funds across borders and engaging in a wide range of legal and illegal businesses, such as narcotics and arms trafficking, as well as money laundering through real estate, art, luxury goods, and more.[1] The central question this report addresses is how Hezbollah organizes, manages, and integrates these clan-based networks abroad. This research examines the Fawaz clan and argues that, while some clans function primarily as crime-funding families, others play also a more strategic role within Hezbollah’s funding and logistical infrastructure in the diaspora through the Foreign Relations Department (FRD) as well as the External Security Organization (ESO), also known or linked to the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Focusing on individuals from the Fawaz clan designated by the United States, the study examines their roles within Hezbollah-linked networks and identifies broader structural patterns. It also situates these individuals within the wider clan context by analyzing the family’s origins and social ecosystem in Lebanon, as well as its business ownership structures and principal hubs of operation in West Africa. This research relies on open-source information. While these sources provide valuable insight into network structures and patterns of activity, they are subject to limitations. As such, the analysis focuses on structural relationships, behavioral patterns, and institutional roles. The first part of the research examines the Shiite clan system in Lebanon, the Lebanese Shiite diaspora, and Hezbollah’s use of these clan-based structures. It also explains the general mechanisms through which Hezbollah is managing the clans via the FRD and channels the funds from the diaspora back to Lebanon.[2] The second part of the research focuses on the Fawaz clan and analyzes its role within Hezbollah-linked networks in West Africa. The final section discusses the relationship between the Fawaz clan and the FRD and presents the study’s conclusions. Clans, kinship, and the Lebanese Diaspora The Clan in the modern Middle East Tribal and clan structures in today’s Middle East continue to have substantial political and social influence.[3] Kinship-based frameworks, such as the “hamula”, extended family, and clans, constitute mechanisms through which authority is exercised, protection is secured, resources are shared, and state institutions and political power are accessed.[4] The main change in modern times is not in the core ideas or values of clans, but in the ways they operate. Clans are no longer limited to rural areas. They now function in urban neighborhoods, small villages, and even among diaspora communities.[5] This shift is also seen in how clans are represented in political parties, militias, local governments, foundations, social networks, and international business groups.[6] As a result, loyalty is now spread across several figures, such as the family or clan leader, political allies, militia leaders, and religious authorities. Clans and family in Lebanon In Lebanon, the idea of the clan is particularly complicated. Family and clan ties almost always shape how the state, citizens, and political parties interact. The family is the main point of social and political identity, while the state comes second. Scholars often refer to this pattern as political familism.[7] In Lebanon, political familism[8] affects how people access employment, use public services, receive legal protection, and access resources, since these are often distributed through family and sector networks. The political system is built around well-known families and dynasties. For many, being Lebanese means belonging to a certain family in a specific region, rather than having a direct connection to the state.[9] In South Lebanon and Jabal Amal, the Shiite community is still organized around traditional structures. Clans and extended families are central to village life, land ownership, religious customs, and political connections. For many years, Lebanese Shiites struggled with economic challenges and political exclusion. These difficulties forced them to build strong support systems through family, clan, religious leaders, and, eventually, organizations such as Amal and Hezbollah.[10] The clan and the Lebanese diaspora Lebanese migrants, particularly Shiites originating from southern Lebanon, have migrated in significant numbers to West Africa, Latin America, and other regions since the early twentieth century (mostly in pursuit for employment). Over time, even as second and third-generation communities emerged, patterns of solidarity and kinship with families in Lebanon continued, becoming especially prominent during periods of crisis, such as the 2006 war with Israel, COVID-19 pandemic and 2024 war with Israel. This connection has continued despite language gaps, place-based identities, and everyday social life in the diaspora that have become largely more localized.[11] In Lebanon, families and clans typically reside in close physical proximity. This pattern changes significantly in the diaspora. Early waves of migration consisted primarily of men who relocated abroad in search of employment; other family members would join later, while parents often remained in Lebanon. These initial migrants laid the foundations for subsequent generations. In the diaspora, clan members are dispersed across cities and even states. The Lebanese tend to settle within broader Lebanese communities in a given town, rather than clustering strictly along clan lines. Despite this geographic dispersion, connections to the clan are maintained through periodic physical visits and, increasingly, through digital communication and social media platforms. One of the main characteristics of the relationship between the diaspora and the family in Lebanon is the flow of remittances from the diaspora, mainly supporting parents’ livelihoods in Lebanon.[12] In fact, remittances from the diaspora to Lebanon reached approximately $6 billion in 2023[13] (as documented remittances). This demonstrates Lebanon’s dependence on remittances from migrants, particularly from large West African communities. Remittance transfer methods During and after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel, cash inflows from the diaspora declined significantly. After the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel on November 27, 2024, Beirut International Airport was placed under tight supervision, particularly by U.S. authorities, making cash transfers in luggage more difficult.[14] The diaspora and their relatives in Lebanon continued to rely on Al-Qard al Hasan bank (linked to Hezbollah and sanctioned for it by the US Department of the Treasury in 2016)[15] for bank transfers. The bank was established with the aim of motivating the Shitte society to support Hezbollah[16] and to overcome the regulated banking system. This continued until Israel targeted many of the bank’s branches and shut down their operations during 2024 war. After the ceasefire at the end of 2024, the bank announced it was reopening its branches, and activity resumed. Due to the close social and organizational linkages among clans in South Lebanon, Shi’a diaspora communities, and Hezbollah, individuals holding accounts at Al-Qard al-Hasan are often viewed with suspicion, as the institution is widely perceived as being associated with Hezbollah’s activities. With the short collapse of Al-Qard al Hasan and the limited cash flow transfer system, the use of formal bank transfers and other formal channels increased. In parallel, there has been a reported increase in the use of unregulated digital channels, such as cryptocurrencies and cash-transfer apps, including Wis