Scorecard: European Nuclear Ambitions Confirmed but Concrete Steps Still Missing

The Prediction

Eight days ago, an AI model predicted a dramatic transformation in European defense policy, forecasting that France and Germany would rapidly establish formal nuclear cooperation mechanisms by mid-2026. The prediction centered on six specific events, ranging from the creation of a European Nuclear Planning Group within three months to major domestic controversies in Germany and pushback from the Trump administration.

What Actually Happened

The recent news provides mixed evidence for these predictions. Most significantly, Article 2 from The Hill (Feb 20) confirms that "German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron provided the most visible manifestation of Europe's new thinking about a nuclear deterrent." This validates the prediction's core premise that these two leaders are indeed driving European nuclear discussions. However, the Munich Security Conference coverage reveals a more complex picture. Articles 6 and 7 describe "strained ties between the U.S. and Europe" and acknowledge that "trust is gone" between the transatlantic partners, but the focus was predominantly on tariffs and trade tensions rather than nuclear deterrence specifically. Article 5 notes Merz's warnings about the eroding "rules-based international order," but doesn't mention formal nuclear planning groups or specific defense spending announcements.

Event-by-Event Analysis

**Event 1 (Nuclear Planning Group):** No evidence has emerged of a formal European Nuclear Planning Group being established. While nuclear deterrence discussions are confirmed to be happening, no institutional structures have been announced. This appears premature for the 3-month timeframe. **Event 2 (German Defense Spending):** Articles 1 and 4 show Merz traveling to Washington and engaging with international partners, but focus entirely on tariff negotiations rather than defense budgets. No announcements about nuclear-capable delivery systems have materialized. **Event 3 (German Public Controversy):** There is no evidence of major domestic controversy in Germany over nuclear participation. The news coverage shows Merz focused on trade issues and "future cooperation with China" rather than facing internal opposition on nuclear policy. **Event 4 (Trump Administration Criticism):** This prediction appears incorrect. Rather than criticizing European nuclear initiatives, the Trump administration's confrontational approach has focused on tariffs (Article 1's Supreme Court tariff decision). The U.S.-Europe tensions are real but centered on economics, not nuclear strategy. **Event 5 (Poland and Nordic Requests):** No evidence of Eastern European states requesting inclusion in nuclear consultations has appeared in the reporting. **Event 6 (Defense Union Treaty):** No such proposal has been announced, though this has a longer 6-month timeframe.

What the AI Got Right

The model correctly identified that European nuclear deterrence discussions would continue post-Munich and that Merz and Macron would be the key drivers. It accurately predicted ongoing U.S.-Europe tensions, though misidentified the primary cause. The broader theme of European strategic autonomy is clearly playing out, as evidenced by multiple articles discussing the eroding post-war order.

What the AI Got Wrong

The prediction overestimated the speed of institutional change. No formal mechanisms have been created in the first week. It also misread the U.S. response, expecting nuclear-focused criticism when Trump's attention remained on trade. Most critically, it predicted immediate domestic controversy in Germany that hasn't materialized—likely because concrete steps toward nuclear participation haven't been taken yet.

Lessons Learned

This case demonstrates how predictions can be directionally accurate (European nuclear discussions are real) while being wrong on timing and specifics (no formal institutions yet). The AI identified the right actors and general trend but overestimated how quickly diplomatic discussions translate into formal policy changes. International relations move slower than conference rhetoric suggests, and multiple competing priorities (like tariffs) can delay even urgent strategic initiatives. The 3-month and 1-month timeframes for several predictions appear to have been too aggressive given the complexity of nuclear policy coordination.