
6 predicted events · 7 source articles analyzed · Model: claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929
As Castilla y León heads toward regional elections on March 15, 2026, the anti-establishment party Se Acabó la Fiesta (SALF) is positioning itself as a potential kingmaker in what could be a fragmented political landscape. Led by eurodiputado Luis 'Alvise' Pérez, the party has signaled an unprecedented flexibility in coalition negotiations that could reshape the region's political future.
At a campaign event in Valladolid's Feria attended by over 500 supporters, Alvise Pérez outlined SALF's strategic approach to the upcoming elections. According to Articles 1-7, Pérez employed a striking metaphor to describe his coalition philosophy: acting "como un buen bailarín" (like a good dancer) who "doesn't worry so much about who he dances with, but first and foremost that the music being played makes sense." This represents a significant departure from traditional Spanish political alliances, where ideological compatibility typically dictates coalition formation. SALF's candidate for the Junta presidency, Lucía Echevarrieta from Burgos, accompanied Pérez at the event, signaling the party's serious intentions in the region. As noted in Articles 4 and 5, SALF is targeting Castilla y León and Aragón—two of Spain's "most depopulated regions"—as testing grounds. In Aragón, they came within 316 votes of securing a seat, demonstrating their growing appeal in rural, overlooked areas.
Pérez has clearly articulated SALF's non-negotiable policy priorities for any coalition agreement: 1. **Tax reduction for self-employed workers (autónomos)** 2. **Reduction of political spending and patronage positions** 3. **Elimination of "ad hoc" appointed positions** According to Articles 2 and 3, Pérez framed SALF's lack of traditional party infrastructure as an advantage, stating they don't have "500 guys to place in administrations" like parties that have been in power for "20 or 30 years." He promised "massive cuts" not to citizen services but to "political spending" and the "clientelist networks" built over decades.
When questioned about potential political isolation, Pérez positioned SALF as the "patito feo" (ugly duckling) subjected to "bullying" by all established parties. However, he notably rejected any agreements with formations that "have murdered people for ideological reasons"—an apparent reference to parties associated with political violence, likely excluding certain Basque or Catalan nationalist groups.
### Scenario 1: SALF Gains Seats and Becomes Pivotal If SALF secures representation in the Cortes of Castilla y León, the most likely outcome is a hung parliament where neither the center-right PP nor the left-wing PSOE can govern alone. SALF's willingness to negotiate with any party based on policy rather than ideology creates several possibilities: **Most Likely Coalition Partner: The PP** Given SALF's focus on reducing taxes, cutting political spending, and eliminating bureaucratic positions, their natural policy alignment lies with center-right economic positions. The PP, which has traditionally governed Castilla y León, would find SALF's fiscal conservatism more compatible than would the PSOE. Expect intense negotiations where SALF extracts concrete commitments on autónomo tax relief and administrative streamlining in exchange for confidence and supply support. **The Price of Support** SALF will likely demand visible, measurable policy wins to demonstrate to their anti-establishment base that they haven't been co-opted. This means Pérez will insist on: - A specific percentage reduction in regional political positions - Measurable tax cuts implemented within the first year - Transparency mechanisms to track spending reductions ### Scenario 2: SALF Falls Just Short Given their narrow miss in Aragón (316 votes), there's a significant possibility SALF could poll well but fail to clear electoral thresholds in some provinces. In this case, their impact would be primarily disruptive—drawing votes away from established parties (likely more from the right than the left) and potentially enabling a PSOE-led coalition by fragmenting the conservative vote.
Pérez's campaign rhetoric about "warming up the muscles" for larger contests (as mentioned in Articles 1, 4, 6, and 7) suggests SALF views these regional elections as preparation for national campaigns. Success in Castilla y León—particularly if they successfully negotiate policy concessions—would provide a blueprint for SALF's expansion into other regions. The party's focus on depopulated areas is strategically savvy. These regions, suffering from decades of demographic decline and economic stagnation, are fertile ground for anti-establishment messaging. Traditional parties have struggled to address rural depopulation effectively, creating an opening for newcomers.
SALF's emergence mirrors broader European trends of anti-establishment, populist movements gaining traction by positioning themselves as outsiders untainted by traditional political patronage. Their explicit rejection of "cordones sanitarios" (political isolation strategies) while simultaneously drawing their own red lines (no collaboration with violent political movements) attempts to occupy a unique political space. The March 15 elections will test whether Spanish voters in rural regions are ready to embrace this new political force—and whether SALF can translate online popularity and European Parliament success into tangible regional power. If successful, expect this model to be replicated across other Spanish autonomous communities throughout 2026 and beyond.
Given their narrow miss in Aragón (316 votes) and substantial campaign presence with 500+ attendees at events, they have momentum but face high electoral thresholds in Spain's proportional system
Their policy priorities (tax cuts, reduced political spending, administrative streamlining) align naturally with center-right economic positions, making the PP the most compatible partner
Pérez has explicitly and repeatedly stated these as non-negotiable priorities; SALF needs visible policy wins to maintain credibility with their anti-establishment base
As a new party without traditional patronage networks, they need concrete deliverables to prove they haven't been absorbed by the establishment
Articles explicitly mention this campaign is about 'warming up muscles' for larger contests, indicating a broader expansion strategy
Pérez already anticipates this by mentioning they're treated as the 'ugly duckling' subjected to 'bullying' by all established parties