Why US-EU defense industrial cooperation matters more than ever

Politico Europe · Feb 23, 2026 · Collected from RSS

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News Opinion Limiting American defense industry participation in European procurement programs threatens that partnership and weakens our mutual security. As the war in Ukraine rages on, U.S. production lines must operate at capacity to supply munitions other nations cannot. | Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP via Getty Images February 23, 2026 4:00 am CET Andrew Puzder is U.S. Ambassador to the EU and Matthew Whitaker is U.S. Ambassador to NATO. The NATO transatlantic alliance has been the foundation of European and American security for decades. Today, as the world faces complex and unprecedented security challenges, the United States and Europe must work together to sustain and strengthen this partnership. Limiting U.S. defense industry participation in European procurement programs threatens that partnership and weakens our mutual security. To their credit, NATO allies have responded to President Donald Trump’s call for increased defense investment, with commitments to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. But for the most part those commitments are as yet unfulfilled, meaning the U.S. still bears a disproportionate share of Europe’s security costs and provides technical and defense production capabilities our NATO allies lack. As the war in Ukraine rages on, U.S. production lines must operate at capacity to supply munitions other nations cannot, such as U.S. air defense systems and their interceptor missiles and F-16 ammunition and spare parts. This is particularly true as the U.S. strives to meet its own defense production needs as well as those of our allies across the world. For the U.S. to continue supplying the armaments Ukraine and NATO member countries need requires orders sufficient to justify their production and the resources to pay for them. With that in mind, the United States has expressed concerns about how EU defense initiatives like Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) restrict market access for American companies. Such exclusionary measures undermine our collective defense by limiting competition, stifling innovation and depriving these companies of the orders they need to maintain production at the levels required to meet our allies’ needs. EDIP and SAFE mandate the EU maintain control over the design, configuration, and future modification of defense systems. And these requirements threaten intellectual property rights, constrain supply chains, and impede transatlantic interoperability. Additionally, these programs impose a 35 percent cap on U.S. industrial participation, limiting the possibility of U.S.-EU joint defense ventures. EU policymakers considering the future of defense cooperation face a clear choice. | Armend Nimani/AFP via Getty Images Looking ahead, we are especially concerned about the Commission’s plan to incorporate “European preference” in the Defense Procurement Directive in 2026. Revisions to the Directive are critical because they will directly impact how EU countries spend their national money on defense procurements. Our view is that EU countries should have the full sovereign autonomy to make decisions about defense procurements — including where to make purchases — without the EU imposing additional eligibility criteria similar to those present in SAFE and EDIP. Similarly, if the goal of the European Commission’s proposed €90 billion loan to Ukraine is for Ukraine to defeat Russia, the EU should allow Ukraine to purchase what it needs as quickly as possible. Otherwise, the loan appears to serve more as an economic development initiative that favors certain EU countries’ defense industries. Let us be clear: We welcome member countries’ efforts to ramp up their defense budgets and the EU utilizing financial levers to encourage more defense spending. But not at the cost of decades of cooperation by fragmenting the defense market and reducing the effectiveness of joint efforts. The economic implications are significant. U.S. defense companies are not merely suppliers; they’re partners who have invested in European economies, created tens of thousands of good-paying European jobs, and provided the advanced technology that strengthens NATO. Our transatlantic defense industry is most effective when nations are free from protectionist policies and able to choose equipment and capabilities best suited to their needs. Joint ventures and transatlantic supply chains have enabled collaboration on next-generation technologies including missile and cyber defense. By leveraging the expertise and resources of American industry, Europe can share the burden of defense investment and ensure access to the best possible equipment. The U.S. has consistently welcomed European investment and competition in our own defense market, including through Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements (RDPAs) with 19 of 27 EU countries. Reciprocal openness is essential to maintain trust and ensure both sides benefit from shared investments. Restrictive measures stand in direct contrast to member countries’ commitments under these agreements and undermine access to our long shared, transatlantic defense industrial base. The stakes are high. A prosperous, secure Europe is in the best interests of both the EU and the United States. European defense capability strengthens NATO and enables both sides to meet global challenges more effectively. Creating barriers for U.S. industry will slow Europe’s rearming efforts and undermine both NATO readiness and interoperability by severing access to integrated transatlantic supply chains. EU policymakers considering the future of defense cooperation face a clear choice — pursue policies that restrict market access and fragment the defense sector, or foster an environment of openness, competition, and innovation. The latter approach supports our collective security, readiness, resilience, and cost-effective investment, benefiting taxpayers, workers, and service members on both sides of the Atlantic.