The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy

foreignpolicy.com · Feb 20, 2026 · Collected from GDELT

Full Article

One term, one year, and one month into Donald Trump’s presidency, analysts continue to debate how to best understand his foreign policy. Some have argued that Trump is adjusting Washington’s traditional approach to new global challenges. Others have argued that his ideological impulses uniquely misunderstand the sources of U.S. strength. For better or worse, it is clear Trump now faces far fewer constraints on foreign policy than in his first term. We maintain that the best approach to understanding Trump’s diplomacy has less to do with the United States’ unique place in the world or the idiosyncrasies of Trump himself, and more to do with his populist form of governance. It has already become commonplace to compare Trump’s domestic policies to those of other populist leaders, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But it is striking how well this comparison holds in the realm of foreign policy as well. The United States is, after all, in a very different geopolitical position than Hungary, India, and Turkey. Yet under Trump, it approaches world politics in a very similar way. One term, one year, and one month into Donald Trump’s presidency, analysts continue to debate how to best understand his foreign policy. Some have argued that Trump is adjusting Washington’s traditional approach to new global challenges. Others have argued that his ideological impulses uniquely misunderstand the sources of U.S. strength. For better or worse, it is clear Trump now faces far fewer constraints on foreign policy than in his first term. We maintain that the best approach to understanding Trump’s diplomacy has less to do with the United States’ unique place in the world or the idiosyncrasies of Trump himself, and more to do with his populist form of governance. It has already become commonplace to compare Trump’s domestic policies to those of other populist leaders, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But it is striking how well this comparison holds in the realm of foreign policy as well. The United States is, after all, in a very different geopolitical position than Hungary, India, and Turkey. Yet under Trump, it approaches world politics in a very similar way. Populist leaders differ vastly in terms of “the people” who they claim to represent. Viewed together, however, they employ similar narratives, modes, tactics, and channels of governing that not only affect politics at home but also distinctly shape behavior abroad. Recent studies show how populism can function as both strategy and ideology, how procedural aspects of decision-making differ from those of nonpopulists, the conditions shaping the intensity of foreign-policy change under populists, and impacts of the global rise of populism on the international order. About two dozen people gather along a sidewalk what looks to be a public park surrounded by a metal fence. A person in the foreground is dressed as Donald Trump, with gold chains over an oversized suit, a towering blond wig, and a crown like the statue of liberty. Models of human mouths opened to shout peek out from the strands of the wig. Demonstrators gather to protest against U.S. President Donald Trump in Boston on Jan. 10.Joseph Prezioso/AFP via Getty Images Consider what we call the seven pillars of popular foreign policy: personalization, hyper-mediatization, “corrupt elites,” grand history, revisionism, extortion, and the (sometimes unsuccessful) pursuit of domestic dividends. In all of these realms, Trump acts all too much like his international populist counterparts. If nothing else, the similarities suggest that it would be a mistake to search too hard for a unique strategic logic animating Trump’s moves on the world stage. 1. Personalization Like Trump, populist leaders—often initially elected freely and fairly—tend to hollow out and, if possible, capture democratic institutions that traditionally serve as checks on their rule. Trump slashed bureaucratic positions in the name of “efficiency,” whereas Erdogan’s purges claimed to target coup-plotters and “terrorists.” Hungary’s Orban designed a new constitutional order. This gutting of institutional knowledge and replacement of skilled personnel with political appointees has serious consequences for foreign-policy decision-making, including unpredictability, high risk tolerance, incompetence, and executive enrichment at the expense of other national priorities. 2. Hyper-mediatization Whereas all leaders engage in political communication, the populist style of politics includes extraordinary use of news and social media to create political spectacles—a form of media as politics. The weekly TV shows of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and recently deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro; the near-daily speeches by Erdogan; and the 3D fireside chats with Modi’s virtual avatar serve to generate emotional connections with publics. Using these platforms to highlight an incumbent’s foreign-policy victories communicates the message that only the current leader can reassert greatness or bring back the status and respect that the people deserve. Trump treats the Oval Office as an actual (newly gilded) stage on which he can alternately chastise or woo foreign leaders, all in front of an exclusively chosen set of media outlets. U.S. officials’ berating of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2025 is a particularly memorable moment—former TV producer Trump remarked that the proceedings would make “great television”—but the public-facing curation of state visits by Saudi and Turkish leaders also showcase the theatrics of populism. Social media has also become a frequent site of politics. Trump uses platforms such as X and his own Truth Social to threaten leaders and signal policy change along with amplifying his accomplishments. 3. “Corrupt elite” Populist leaders view international politics as an arena in which they assert themselves as rightful and necessary guardians of a “pure people” against economic and cultural elites of a corrupt establishment. Populists claim to securitize the interests of “the people” by demanding international status and defending the nation—people, values, territory—against nefarious foreign elites and their domestic conspirators. Populists around the world are adept at framing their “corrupt elites” as in league with the United States, Europe, or the West. Chávez excoriated U.S. and EU immigration policies as “legalized barbarism” at a Mercosur summit in 2008. While hosting the G-20 summit in 2023, Modi, whom pro-government media touts as “Solar Superman,” condemned Western leaders who would impose restrictive policies on developing states. Trump maintains this populist script, continuing to criticize the Western-designed order from a position of power in a Western capital. When accusing “liberals” of deliberately undermining the United States and making it a global laughingstock, he routinely suggests that they are operating in league with cosmopolitan and thus un-American interests. In twice withdrawing the United States from UNESCO, for example, Trump’s stated reason in the latter instance was that the international body had become “woke.” 4. Grand history Populist narratives about history invoke nostalgia for idealized pasts, establish continuity with the current leader, and blame previous administrations for lost material and reputational greatness. Erdogan invokes an Ottoman past to justify Turkey’s regional assertiveness. Modi draws on Hindu nationalist history to position India as a civilizational global power. Orban wields history to justify a pro-Russian stance that aims, in turn, to strengthen Hungary. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda challenges the previous narrative at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Instead of taking pride in U.S.-designed multilateral organizations, Trump frames them as constraints on American power. He argues Washington bankrolls NATO while European states act as free riders, and that the rules-based, post-Cold War order is a betrayal of U.S. interests orchestrated by the aforementioned globalist cabal. These claims were used to justify a shift to unilateralism, transactional relations with allies, and withdrawal from previous agreements such as the Paris climate accord and the Iranian nuclear deal. 5. Revisionism By conflating the international community with “corrupt elites,” populists can often embrace revisionism that brings them into conflict with longtime allies. Populist-led states that aren’t superpowers also seek revisions of the international order that elevate their status. Erdogan’s frequent admonishments at United Nations assemblies that “the world is bigger than five”—referring to U.N. Security Council’s permanent members—aim to disrupt the traditional power balance in Turkey’s favor. At a regional level, Orban used Hungary’s term in the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union to “bulldoze” the bloc’s norms and challenge the multilateral structure from within. In Trump’s case, the “Jacksonian populist nationalism” that statecraft scholar Walter Russell Mead first identified in 2017 has expanded exponentially. In his second term, Trump behaves like an “emperor abroad,” in the words of Elizabeth N. Saunders. The widespread tariffs in the name of “America First,” challenges to the authority of international institutions, and territorial claims against NATO allies all suggest a revisionist approach that looks more like that of rising powers in the global south than a onetime hegemon. 6. Extortion Populists believe that any foreign-policy action requires a payoff. And populists don’t shy away from artificially creating their own opportunities to secure them. This is often achieved by rocking the boat and then demanding