For the Gulf States, Investment in AI Is Partly About U.S. Protection

Foreign Policy · Feb 23, 2026 · Collected from RSS

Full Article

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE hope to become artificial intelligence hubs. Cook-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist4 Steven A. Cook By Steven A. Cook, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. About two dozen people mill about around a miniature model of several city blocks displayed on a white table. Guests look at a model of what is intended to be the largest data center in the UAE, under construction in Abu Dhabi as the Stargate initiative, during the International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on Nov. 3, 2025. Giuseppe Cacace / AFP Get audio access with any FP subscription. Subscribe Now ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN February 23, 2026, 11:51 AM The three most influential Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—are investing hundreds of billions in artificial intelligence. The Emiratis were early movers, staking out a national strategy for AI and naming a minister of state for artificial intelligence in 2017. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has framed Riyadh’s push into AI around his broader Vision 2030 reform project, though it was not mentioned in the original document. A Saudi Data and AI Authority was created in 2019 and announced a strategy for the technology in 2020, but the Public Investment Fund only set up an AI company called Humain in 2025. Saudi Aramco has been nimbler than the investment fund, however, leveraging the technology for its operations for longer. Qatar established an AI committee in 2021, but Doha was too busy investing in the media, universities, and lobbying in Washington to do much with the technology. Doha did not get serious about artificial intelligence until late last year, when the Qatar Investment Authority established Qatar’s national AI company, Qai. These investments make sense, given AI’s rapid development and the widespread belief that artificial intelligence will radically transform economies and societies in ways that were previously only the stuff of Hollywood. Because Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders are seeking to diversify their economies, which have long been dependent on hydrocarbons, it follows that they regard AI as a critical means to their post-oil and gas futures. The three most influential Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—are investing hundreds of billions in artificial intelligence. The Emiratis were early movers, staking out a national strategy for AI and naming a minister of state for artificial intelligence in 2017. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has framed Riyadh’s push into AI around his broader Vision 2030 reform project, though it was not mentioned in the original document. A Saudi Data and AI Authority was created in 2019 and announced a strategy for the technology in 2020, but the Public Investment Fund only set up an AI company called Humain in 2025. Saudi Aramco has been nimbler than the investment fund, however, leveraging the technology for its operations for longer. Qatar established an AI committee in 2021, but Doha was too busy investing in the media, universities, and lobbying in Washington to do much with the technology. Doha did not get serious about artificial intelligence until late last year, when the Qatar Investment Authority established Qatar’s national AI company, Qai. These investments make sense, given AI’s rapid development and the widespread belief that artificial intelligence will radically transform economies and societies in ways that were previously only the stuff of Hollywood. Because Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders are seeking to diversify their economies, which have long been dependent on hydrocarbons, it follows that they regard AI as a critical means to their post-oil and gas futures. We should take the Gulf states at face value on AI. After all, the United States and China are doing much of the same, but on a broader scale, and in competition with each other. There is no coming in second in AI, so U.S. policymakers, who are already focused on the challenge that the Chinese government presents to American power, are committed to “winning the [AI] race,” as the White House puts it. And that is why, despite the obvious economic necessity of their investment in AI, the Saudis, Emiratis, and Qataris are also engaged in a geopolitical game of their own: The three countries want to become players in the AI race by partnering with the likes of Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, and others. If they become critical partners with some of United States’ biggest tech companies in artificial intelligence, it is a lock that the United States will guarantee their security. The folks in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha will not need formal U.S. security guarantees. AI is the mother of all insurance policies. There is precedent for the AI-security dynamic, though it has nothing to do with artificial intelligence. Located about 25 miles west of the Qatari capital, Doha, lies Al Udeid Air Base. The Qataris constructed it in the mid-1990s with the specific aim of attracting U.S. forces there. The United States did not start to use it until after 9/11, but by 2003 had shifted most of its forces from Saudi Arabia to Qatar. Al Udeid was the place from which U.S. Central Command ran the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and prosecuted the campaigns against al Qaeda and the Islamic State. During the disastrous withdrawal from Kabul in 2021, many of Washington’s Afghan allies were evacuated to Al Udeid. In the quarter century that U.S. forces have used it, the base has proved to be invaluable to the United States. And what’s in it for the Qataris? Security. Not long before they started building Al Udeid, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani overthrew his father, the then-Emir Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani. A little more than six months after he seized power, the new emir put down an attempted putsch that would have returned his father to power. This palace intrigue came four years after Saudi and Qatari forces had engaged in a gunfight at small border outpost between the two countries, killing two Qataris and a Saudi. The violence, during which the Saudis overran the Qatari position, led to the suspension of a 1965 agreement that demarcated the borders between the two countries. The dispute was only resolved in 2001. Given this context, it is clear why the Qataris wanted to build Al Udeid and hand the keys to the U.S. military. The presence of U.S. forces at the base would be a strong signal of support for the emir. Angry relatives and regional powers would likely never threaten the Qatari leader or his territory so long as thousands of U.S. service members were based at Al Udeid. It was a perfect setup: The base made it easier and cheaper for Washington to pursue its regional interests making the emir an indispensable and thus well-protected U.S. partner. This was a case of Qatari opportunism at its finest. The Gulf states’ investment in AI operates in part on a similar principle. By making themselves essential in the U.S. effort to win the artificial intelligence competition, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar ensure that their own adversaries become Washington’s adversaries as well. No geopolitical competitor is going to mess with these countries so long as the United States has a vested interest in the preservation of their current leaders. It is good to be on Team America. What’s more, being on Team America doesn’t necessarily entail giving up relationships with Washington’s adversaries. For example, the Saudis, Emiratis, and Qataris all have well-developed economic and security ties with China. Oil and gas sales to China and the role that Chinese companies (which have priced out U.S. firms) have played in developing infrastructure around the region are critical to the development of the Gulf countries. Mohammed bin Salman; Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who is the president of the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani have likely calculated that their relationship with Beijing will probably not undercut an U.S. commitment to them as they become integrated into Washington’s own AI efforts. Winning the AI race with the Chinese government is just too important for the United States. That is what the Gulf countries are banking on. United States Steven A. Cook Steven A. Cook is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest book is The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. X: @stevenacook Read More Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on Dec. 1, 2024. The Saudi Arabia-UAE Dispute Is About More Than Just Yemen The divide is forcing countries across the region to take sides. Attendees view an artificial intelligence data center at the Mobile World Congress, which bills itself as the world's biggest mobile fair, in Barcelona on March 3. Is Artificial Intelligence Worth the Investment? Tech firms will spend trillions on AI in the coming years. A journalist is silhouetted in front of a neon-lighted poster that reads "AI from Africa to the world" at the first AI research center established in Africa by Google in Accra, Ghana. Artificial Intelligence Will Entrench Global Inequality The debate about regulating AI urgently needs input from the global south. Stories Readers Liked Go to slide 1 Go to slide 2 Go to slide 3 Go to slide 4 Go to slide 5 Go to slide 6 Go to slide 7 Go to slide 8 Go to slide 9 Go to slide 10 A large crowd of people carrying flags and holding signs with faces on them. Italian soldiers attend the opening ceremony of NATO's Trident Juncture exercise at the Italian Air Force base in Trapani, Sicily, on Oct. 19, 2015. An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" a