Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis Set to Dominate AU Agenda as Regional Powers Complicate Peace Prospects

The Current Situation

The 39th African Union Summit, which opened on February 14, 2026, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, has brought Sudan's devastating civil war to the forefront of continental concerns. According to Articles 1 and 2, after nearly three years of fighting, the conflict has killed tens of thousands and displaced more than 11 million people, with the United Nations now describing it as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. While the official summit theme focuses on water access and sanitation, as noted in Articles 4 and 5, ongoing conflicts—particularly in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—have pushed security concerns to dominate the agenda. AU Commission Chairman Mahmoud Ali Youssouf used his opening address to call for the "silencing of the guns" across the continent, according to Article 3, though a clear path to resolution remains elusive.

Key Trends and Complicating Factors

A critical trend emerging from the summit is the recognition that Sudan's conflict cannot be understood in isolation. Articles 1 and 2 both emphasize that diplomats are warning about the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates overshadowing the conflict while fueling wider regional tensions, including in Libya and between Eritrea and Ethiopia—the very nation hosting the summit. This external dimension represents a significant obstacle to AU-led peace efforts. The involvement of Gulf powers suggests that resolution will require not just African diplomacy but complex negotiations involving Middle Eastern actors with competing interests in the region. Another notable trend is the AU's focus on multiple crisis points simultaneously. Article 3 highlights that alongside Sudan, leaders are addressing the Palestinian crisis, with Youssouf calling the situation an "extermination" that must end. This dual focus may dilute attention and resources available for Sudan specifically.

Predictions: What Happens Next

### 1. Increased AU Diplomatic Initiatives, Limited Success The summit will likely produce renewed AU-led mediation efforts and perhaps a special envoy appointment for Sudan. However, these initiatives will face significant headwinds. The AU's track record on conflict resolution, combined with the complex web of external actors involved, suggests that any breakthrough will be incremental at best. Expect public commitments to peace processes and humanitarian corridors, but the Saudi-UAE rivalry identified in Articles 1 and 2 will continue to undermine unified regional pressure. The AU may establish working groups or contact committees, but concrete results will remain elusive in the near term. ### 2. Escalating Humanitarian Emergency With 11 million people already displaced and no clear resolution pathway, the humanitarian situation will deteriorate further before it improves. The rainy season approaching in mid-2026 will compound displacement challenges, creating conditions for disease outbreaks in overcrowded camps. International humanitarian organizations will issue increasingly urgent appeals for funding, though donor fatigue and competing global crises will limit response capacity. The UN's designation of Sudan as the world's worst humanitarian crisis, mentioned in Articles 1 and 2, will likely be reinforced with even more alarming statistics in coming months. ### 3. Regional Spillover Effects Intensify The tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia referenced in Articles 1 and 2 will likely escalate as Sudan's instability creates security vacuums along borders. Refugee flows into Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt will increase, straining these countries' already limited resources and potentially destabilizing border regions. The Libya connection mentioned suggests that armed groups and weapons flows will continue circulating throughout the region, with Sudan serving as both source and destination for conflict resources. ### 4. Gulf Powers Maintain Competing Interests Saudi Arabia and the UAE will continue pursuing divergent strategies in Sudan, with each supporting different factions or attempting to secure strategic interests (ports, agricultural land, military bases). This rivalry will prevent the unified international pressure necessary for compelling warring parties to negotiate seriously. Neither Gulf power has sufficient incentive to change course, particularly as their competition plays out across multiple regional theaters including Yemen, Libya, and the Horn of Africa. ### 5. Limited Progress on UN Security Council Reform Article 4 notes that UN Secretary-General António Guterres renewed his appeal for permanent African representation on the UN Security Council. While this issue will receive rhetorical support, concrete progress will remain stalled due to existing permanent members' reluctance to dilute their power. This continued marginalization will reinforce African leaders' frustration with global governance structures, potentially driving more autonomous continental initiatives—though these will lack the enforcement capacity to significantly alter conflict dynamics.

The Path Forward

The most likely scenario over the next 3-6 months is one of continued deterioration punctuated by diplomatic activity that produces limited results. The AU Summit will generate commitments and initiatives, but the structural factors preventing resolution—external power competition, fragmented regional interests, and weak enforcement mechanisms—will persist. For meaningful progress, several conditions would need to align: Gulf powers finding common ground, sustained international pressure backed by enforcement mechanisms, and genuine buy-in from Sudanese conflict parties. None of these appear imminent based on current trends. The tragic reality is that Sudan's crisis, despite being recognized as the world's worst humanitarian emergency, will likely worsen before the political will and diplomatic alignment necessary for resolution can materialize.